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HUCK VS. JOJO: MORAL IGNORANCE AND THE (A)SYMMETRY OF 
PRAISE AND BLAME 
David Faraci and David Shoemaker 
 
The more I studied about this the more my conscience went to grinding 
me, and the more wicked and low-down and ornery I got to feeling. And at 
last, when it hit me all of a sudden that here was the plain hand of 
Providence slapping me in the face and letting me know my wickedness 
was being watched all the time from up there in heaven, whilst I was 
stealing a poor old woman's nigger that hadn’t ever done me no harm, and 
now was showing me there’s One that's always on the lookout, and ain’t a-
going to allow no such miserable doings to go only just so fur and no 
further, I most dropped in my tracks I was so scared. Well, I tried the best I 
could to kinder soften it up somehow for myself by saying I was brung up 
wicked, and so I warn’t so much to blame; but something inside of me kept 
saying, “There was the Sunday-school, you could a gone to it; and if you’d 
a done it they’d a learnt you there that people that acts as I’d been acting 
about that nigger goes to everlasting fire.” (31.19) It made me shiver. And I 
about made up my mind to pray, and see if I couldn’t try to quit being the 
kind of a boy I was and be better. So I kneeled down. But the words 
wouldn’t come. Why wouldn't they? It warn’t no use to try and hide it 
from Him. Nor from ME, neither. I knowed very well why they wouldn’t 
come. It was because my heart warn’t right; it was because I warn’t square; 
it was because I was playing double. I was letting ON to give up sin, but 
away inside of me I was holding on to the biggest one of all. I was trying to 
make my mouth SAY I would do the right thing and the clean thing, and go 
and write to that nigger’s owner and tell where he was; but deep down in 
me I knowed it was a lie, and He knowed it. You can’t pray a lie—I found 
that out. (31.20) [After writing the note,] I felt good and all washed clean of 
sin for the first time I had ever felt so in my life, and I knowed I could pray 
now. But I didn’t do it straight off, but laid the paper down and set there 
thinking—thinking how good it was all this happened so, and how near I 
come to being lost and going to hell. And went on thinking. And got to 
thinking over our trip down the river; and I see Jim before me all the time: 
in the day and in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, 
and we a-floating along, talking and singing and laughing. But somehow I 
couldn’t seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but only the 
other kind. I’d see him standing my watch on top of his’n, ‘stead of calling 
me, so I could go on sleeping; and see him how glad he was when I come 
back out of the fog; and when I come to him again in the swamp, up there 
where the feud was; and such-like times; and would always call me honey, 
and pet me and do everything he could think of for me, and how good he 
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always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him by telling the men we 
had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, and said I was the best friend 
old Jim ever had in the world, and the ONLY one he’s got now; and then I 
happened to look around and see that paper. (31.23) It was a close place. I 
took it up, and held it in my hand. I was a-trembling, because I’d got to 
decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it. I studied a minute, 
sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself: “All right, then, I’ll GO 
to hell”—and tore it up. (31.24, 31.25) 
 
In these famous scenes from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Huck is trying 
desperately to decide what to do with Jim, the slave he has been traveling with 
down the river, the man who is, to Huck’s mind, someone else’s property. When 
given the opportunity to return Jim to his “rightful owner,” Huck ultimately decides 
to go against his upbringing, his conscience, and societal norms in not turning Jim 
in. Consequently, by his own lights he is going to hell for doing what he sincerely 
believes is the wrong thing. By our lights, though, he is clearly doing the right 
thing, despite his morally deprived upbringing. Is he thus praiseworthy? 
Compare the following case: 
JoJo is the favorite son of Jo the First, an evil and sadistic dictator of 
a small, undeveloped country. Because of his father’s special feelings 
for the boy, JoJo is given a special education and is allowed to 
accompany his father and observe his daily routine. In light of this 
treatment, it is not surprising that little JoJo takes his father as a role 
model and develops values very much like Dad’s. As an adult, he 
does many of the same sorts of things his father did, including 
sending people to prison or to death or to torture chambers on the 
basis of whim. He is not coerced to do these things, he acts according 
to his own desires. Moreover, these are desires he wholly wants to 
have. When he steps back and asks, “Do I really want to be this sort 
of person?” his answer is resoundingly, “Yes,” for this way of life 
expresses a crazy sort of power that forms part of his deepest ideal.1 
In torturing a peasant on a whim, JoJo goes along with his upbringing and 
conscience, doing what he sincerely believes is the right thing but what we know is 
the wrong thing. Is he thus blameworthy? 
Both Huck and JoJo were raised in morally blinkered environments, and 
they have both consequently come to accept deeply mistaken moral views: Huck 
                                                 
1 Susan Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will 2nd 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2003, p. 379. 
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thinks he ought to return Jim to his “owner”; and JoJo thinks it is morally 
permissible (or perhaps obligatory) to beat peasants when he feels like it.  
There have been (at least) two assumptions theorists have thought it natural 
to make in cases like these. First, it seems plausible to some that moral deprivation 
of this sort is a responsibility-undermining factor, that those who were raised in 
such morally blinkered environments are off the hook when it comes to 
assignments of moral responsibility. So JoJo, we might think, is excused for beating 
the peasants given the extent of his childhood moral deprivation. Call this the Moral 
Deprivation-Excuse Thesis (the MDE Thesis).2 Second, it is widely believed that 
praiseworthiness is the positive analogue of blameworthiness, and thus that factors 
affecting judgments of moral responsibility should have symmetrical effects on 
judgments of praise- and blameworthiness. Call this the Symmetry Thesis.3 On a 
natural interpretation of this thesis, if poor moral upbringing mitigates assignments 
of JoJo’s blameworthiness, it ought likewise to mitigate assignments of 
praiseworthiness in cases of equivalent moral deprivation. 
In this essay, we examine how certain sorts of moral knowledge 
deprivations in an agent’s upbringing bear on people’s actual assessments of that 
agent’s responsibility. At first blush, the data we have collected appears to cast 
doubt on both the MDE and Symmetry theses. First, our experimental results 
suggest that people do not, in fact, view deprivation as wholly morally excusing 
(though they do not view it as irrelevant, either). Second, our data appear to suggest 
that people have commitments to distinctly different conditions for blame- and 
praiseworthy agency.4 This seems to cast doubt on the Symmetry Thesis.  
In both cases, however, we argue that the correct response to our data is not 
simply to reject the theses in question. First, our results suggest that the 
relationship between deprivation and moral assessment is more nuanced than 
straightforward acceptance or denial of the MDE Thesis can account for. In earlier 
work, we discovered that while people do not judge JoJo to be wholly blameworthy, 
they do not judge him to be blameless, either. And the data we present here seems 
                                                 
2 This is the view taken by Wolf, as we will detail below. 
3 The Symmetry Thesis is widespread. It is entailed by what Doris and Knobe call the more 
general assumption of invariance in moral responsibility assessments. For discussion and 
citation, see John Doris and Joshua Knobe, “Strawsonian Variations: Folk Morality and the 
Search for a Unified Explanation,” in John Doris, ed., The Moral Psychology Handbook (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
4 Knobe and Doris include this asymmetry in their list, based on early experimental results 
generated by one of us, but those experiments remained unpublished pending further 





to confirm this for other cases of moral deprivation. This suggests that while the 
MDE Thesis cannot be accepted as it stands, it has captured an important aspect of 
blameworthiness judgments. As for the Symmetry Thesis, we argue that it can be 
interpreted in a way that renders it consistent with our data.  
In both cases—especially if we are to vindicate our interpretation of the 
Symmetry Thesis—it is an important question why people judge as they do. In our 
earlier work, we hypothesized that people judge JoJo as they do because of the 
difficulty JoJo would have in overcoming his upbringing and doing the right thing. 
After considering some alternatives, we argue that the very same hypothesis can 
help vindicate our interpretation of the Symmetry Thesis. This, we take it, both 
buttresses the plausibility of our claims about difficulty, and represents an 
independent advance in our understanding of the roots of praise and blame.  
 
Blinkered Badness 
In the previous work mentioned, we explicitly explored folk intuitions on the JoJo 
case.5 In her original presentation and discussion of the case, Susan Wolf offers a 
strong version of what we have labeled the MDE Thesis, claiming that people’s 
pretheoretic intuitions are that JoJo, because of his terribly deprived upbringing, is 
not morally responsible, period, for his actions, despite their flowing from his deep 
self, i.e., his “true” or “real” evaluating or authenticating character.6 Her diagnosis 
for this alleged reaction is that JoJo’s deep self is normatively insane, i.e., he lacks 
the ability to recognize goodness, badness, and the difference between them.7 She 
then introduces a sanity—normative competence—condition into her theory of 
moral responsibility to account for such cases. 
Insofar as Wolf is claiming a result on behalf of our pretheoretic intuitions, 
we decided to test her claim. Our findings were that, while people did judge JoJo to 
be less blameworthy than a control (JoJo’s presumably sane but nasty father), they 
still found him to be seriously blameworthy, assigning him an average 
blameworthiness score of 5 (where 7 was completely blameworthy and 1 was not at 
all blameworthy). Insofar as blameworthiness rides piggyback on responsibility (at 
least prima facie, see below), JoJo is definitely viewed (pretheoretically) as morally 
                                                 
5 David Faraci and David Shoemaker, “Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case 
of JoJo,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2010): 319-332. 
6 On pp. 379-80, Wolf says “In light of JoJo’s heritage and upbringing…it is dubious at best that 
he should be regarded as responsible for what he does.” Later on p. 380, she says, “Our judgment 
that JoJo is not a responsible agent is one that we can make only from the inside…” (emphasis 
ours). 




responsible to some degree, contrary to Wolf’s strong version of the MDE Thesis. 
We took this at the very least to indicate that her adoption of a sanity condition was 
unmotivated. 
But—and this is the interesting bit—JoJo was viewed as less blameworthy 
than he would have been without such a deprived background, so deprivation of 
this sort does seem to excuse to some extent. But what precisely was the relation of 
this deprivation to reduced blameworthiness? And could it be overcome?  
Our initial diagnosis of JoJo’s reduced blameworthiness derived from his 
moral ignorance, not his normative insanity: It wasn’t that he lacked the capacity to 
recognize right and wrong; it was, rather, that he had, as a child, been deprived of 
exposure to relevant moral alternatives. We attempted to explore these issues via 
the presentation of a third scenario in which JoJo was eventually exposed to moral 
alternatives but rejected them in favor of continuing to adhere to Daddy’s value 
system. Here, surprisingly, there was no statistically significant difference between 
people’s reactions to the first and second JoJos. This might suggest, then, that it was 
their unfortunate formative circumstances that (slightly) mitigated their 
blameworthiness, and not their mere moral ignorance. But we remained 
unconvinced, arguing instead that the JoJos displayed a more fundamental and 
insidious type of moral ignorance than is usually discussed—an ignorance that 
expressions of ill will are wrong, not an ignorance of what specific act-tokens count 
as expressions of ill will—and that this sort of ignorance may not be displaced by 
mere exposure to moral alternatives (which would do nothing to counteract the 
thought that it’s generally morally permissible to express ill will).8 What reduces 
the degree of their blameworthiness, we suggested, was not any sort of incapacity, 
though; rather, it was the difficulty of overcoming their childhood moral 
deprivations as adults, a difficulty that nevertheless assumes the possibility of 
success and so grants a basic normative capacity to them (a necessary condition to 
their being judged to be seriously blameworthy in the first place). 
In our current round of experiments, we aimed to do two things. First, we 
wanted to see if we could duplicate the JoJo-type results in cases in which 
normative capacities were not at issue, and neither were any thoroughgoing 
childhood deprivations regarding the general wrongness of expressions of ill will. 
                                                 
8 We put this in terms of “ill will” in the original paper, but we recognize this to be a quite 
ambiguous notion. (See David Shoemaker’s “Qualities of Will,” forthcoming in Social Philosophy 
& Policy for discussion.) We could have put this in less ambiguous terms as follows without 
losing the point: In standard cases of moral ignorance, the agent knows what properties make an 
act right or wrong but doesn’t know whether some particular act-type instantiates those 
properties; JoJo’s ignorance, on the other hand, is about what properties make actions right or 
wrong in the first place, and so is much more profound. 
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This would enable us to focus solely on the work being done by ignorance with 
respect to a specific sort of moral value. Second, we wanted to explore whether 
structurally identical positive cases would yield analogous results. We will explain 
this latter point in the next section of the essay, focusing here solely on the former. 
New subjects were presented, at random, with one of the following two 
scenarios:9 
A. Tom is a white male who was raised in New Orleans. Growing 
up, he was taught to respect all people equally. Nevertheless, as an 
adult, he decided to become a proud racist, someone who believes 
that all non-white people are inferior and that he has a moral 
obligation to humiliate them when he gets a chance. At the age of 
25, Tom moves to another town. Walking outside his home, he sees 
a black man who has tripped and fallen. In keeping with his moral 
beliefs, Tom spits on the man as he passes by. 
B. Tom is a white male who was raised on an isolated island in the 
bayous of Louisiana. Growing up, he was taught to believe that all 
non-white people are inferior and that he has a moral obligation to 
humiliate them when he gets a chance. As an adult, he fully 
embraced what he’d been taught, becoming a proud racist. At the 
age of 25, Tom moves to another town. Walking outside his home, 
he sees a black man who has tripped and fallen. In keeping with his 
moral beliefs, Tom spits on the man as he passes by. 
For each scenario, subjects were asked to rate Tom’s blameworthiness for 
spitting on the black man on a scale from 1 (“not all blameworthy”) to 7 
(“completely blameworthy”). 
Our prediction, in keeping with our results from the earlier paper, were that 
TomB’s upbringing and resultant ignorance with respect to the morality of racism 
would mitigate attributions of moral blameworthiness. The mean response to TomA 
was 6.68, a very robust blameworthiness score. The mean response to TomB was 
significantly lower at 5.4.10 We conclude from this, again in keeping with earlier 
results, that certain sorts of moral blinders—i.e., childhood deprivations of exposure 
to moral truth—reduce blameworthiness assessments somewhat, but nowhere near 
completely.11 And, once again, the fact that subjects viewed TomB as seriously 
                                                 
9 n(A)=84; n(B)=84. 
10 Results were subjected to an independent samples T-Test: t(166) = 6.54, p<0.001 (two-tailed), 
SD (ignorant) 1.53, SD (non-ignorant) 0.92, Cohen’s d = 1.01. 
11 It might be thought that the vignettes do not do enough to establish sufficiently robust moral 
ignorance in TomB’s case, as anyone growing up in the modern area will surely have been 
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blameworthy reveals that they likely believed him not to lack the relevant 
normative capacities, i.e., sanity was not an issue. Finally, our speculative 
explanation remains quite plausible: We propose that the reason people judge TomB 
to be seriously blameworthy, despite the blameworthiness-reducing fact of his 
deprived childhood, is that, while it is more difficult for him to identify and do the 
right thing because of that childhood, it is nevertheless not overly demanding to 
expect him to do so.  
Some new features we included buttressed this hypothesis by diminishing 
the plausibility of alternative explanations. First, we had Tom in both scenarios 
move to another town at the age of 25 in order to avoid the kind of ongoing isolated 
“preciousness” of the original JoJo case, and also to establish that he is an adult 
(with a fully-grown brain) who is making genuine moral decisions. His moving to 
another town would presumably also have given him opportunities to be exposed to 
moral alternatives. The question, then, was how that exposure would interact with 
what he had been taught as a child in people’s assessments of him. As it turns out, if 
he was taught the moral truth and rejected that as an adult, he was viewed as 
particularly blameworthy for spitting on the black man, less so, if he had been 
taught the racist moral lie but simply didn’t reject it. 
Second, we deliberately left open why it is that Tom either rejects or 
embraces what he’s been taught. The reason was to allow for the possibility of any 
of the wide variety of sources of evaluations that occur in everyday life, and so not 
to privilege certain sources over others. Sometimes people evaluate after having 
pored over the reasons on both sides and determining which ones weigh more. 
Other times people evaluate after having seen a movie on the subject and without 
further deliberation. Other times people simply follow their intuitive hunches. 
Presumably all of these are methods that will preserve responsibility in assessors’ 
eyes.  
Of course, the extent to which our proposal is plausible depends not only on 
the paucity of plausible alternatives, but on the inherent plausibility of the proposal 
itself. As has become clear to us since first introducing the proposal, more details 
about the nature of the difficulty in question are required before plausibility can be 
adequately assessed.12 However, we set this matter to the side momentarily in order 
                                                                                                                                     
exposed to alternatives through TV, radio, the internet, or vacations. Given that this might be an 
assumption of the subjects who read the vignettes, then it might have grounded their being 
pretty punitive. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.) This is a fair point, 
and it is worth controlling for. Nevertheless, we doubt it is doing much work for subjects, given 
that we stressed JoJo’s isolation and lack of exposure to alternatives in the original study, and 
we got nearly identical response levels to our JoJo doppelganger in the latest one. 
12 Thanks to two anonymous referees and Shaun Nichols for pressing us to say more about the 
idea of difficulty in this context. 
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to introduce the remainder of our data, which are relevant to our explication of the 
nature of the difficulty in question.  
Thus far, we have been considering the effects of moral deprivation on 
assignments of blameworthiness. Especially given our interest in the Symmetry 
Thesis, the obvious question now is whether similar results obtain in cases of 
praiseworthy action. It is to that question that we now turn. 
 
Blinkered Goodness 
The Symmetry Thesis avers that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are 
structurally analogous. If so, then it seems we should expect that childhood moral 
deprivations will reduce praiseworthiness in people’s eyes just as they do 
blameworthiness, at least for actions within the zone germane to the relevant 
deprivations. The basic thought here is rather compelling. It would seem that 
degrees of blame- or praiseworthiness both ought to track degrees of childhood-
based moral ignorance in the same way: The less you know, the less you’re “on the 
hook” in either case. If the Symmetry Thesis were true, childhood moral deprivations 
presumably ought to reduce moral responsibility all the way round. 
The data, however, appear to undermine the Symmetry Thesis, at least when 
understood in this way. Further subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
following two cases:13 
C. Tom is a white male who was raised in New Orleans. Growing 
up, he was taught to respect all people equally. Nevertheless, as an 
adult, he decided to become a proud racist, someone who believes 
that all non-white people are inferior and that he has a moral 
obligation to humiliate them when he gets a chance. At the age of 
25, Tom moves to another town. Walking outside his home, he sees 
a black man trip and fall. Usually, Tom would spit on the man. But 
this time, Tom goes against his current moral beliefs, and helps the 
man up instead. 
D. Tom is a white male who was raised on an isolated island in the 
bayous of Louisiana. Growing up, he was taught to believe that all 
non-white people are inferior and that he has a moral obligation to 
humiliate them when he gets a chance. As an adult, he decided to 
become a proud racist, embracing what he was taught. At the age of 
25, Tom moves to another town. Walking outside his home, he sees 
a black man trip and fall. Usually, Tom would spit on the man. But 
                                                 
13 n(C)=85; n(D)=83. 
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this time, Tom goes against his current moral beliefs, and helps the 
man up instead. 
This time, subjects were asked to rate Tom’s level of praiseworthiness on a 
scale from 1 (“not at all praiseworthy”) to 7 (“completely praiseworthy”). The mean 
response to TomC was 4.28. The mean response to TomD was 5.40.14  
There are several surprising conclusions one might draw here. First, TomC, 
who was raised with moral awareness but adopted racism as an adult, is only 
viewed as “somewhat praiseworthy” for going against those moral beliefs in doing 
the right thing. TomA—TomC’s twin who adhered to his adult-formed moral beliefs 
in spitting on the black man—was viewed as nearly completely blameworthy for 
doing so. Perhaps, then, the resistance to seeing TomC as more praiseworthy is due 
to his still being a racist? 
This can’t explain all the data, however, because TomD is also a racist, and 
yet he is viewed as significantly more praiseworthy than TomC in going against his 
moral beliefs. It seems the only thing that could ground the difference in people’s 
assessments here is the difference in upbringings. But then here is the second 
surprising conclusion: As discussed above, it seems plausible that TomD’s moral 
ignorance would be generally mitigating, that if he didn’t know that his racism was 
wrong, then he couldn’t know that his going against it was right. But apparently 
knowledge of the rightness of one’s actions isn’t viewed as necessary for 
praiseworthiness; indeed (and this is the truly surprising point) moral ignorance 
seems to be viewed as a virtue. Not only is the MDE Thesis being denied here, it is 
being turned on its head. 
And thus we come to the third surprising feature. While moral ignorance 
reduces blameworthiness, it seemingly increases praiseworthiness. Importantly, this 
way of putting it suggests that the Symmetry Thesis as understood thus far is false, 
or at least highly problematic. 
 
Resilient Symmetry 
Nevertheless, we would like to explore the possibility of a different 
interpretation of the Symmetry Thesis that could allow for it to be maintained in 
light of our results. To this point, we have understood the thesis to imply that 
factors reducing blameworthiness also reduce praiseworthiness, that negative 
and positive cases are symmetrical with respect to whether the relevant praise- 
or blameworthiness is reduced or increased (in comparison to some paradigm 
control case). It looks as if the Tom cases undermine this symmetry: The 
                                                 
14 As before, results were subjected to an independent samples T-Test: t(166) = 4.18, p < 0.001 
(two-tailed), SD (ignorant) 1.69, SD (non-ignorant) 1.76, Cohen’s d = 0.65. 
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ignorance reducing TomB’s blameworthiness score actually increases TomD’s 
praiseworthiness score. Understood in this way, the relevant comparison point 
is the baseline at which Tom is not at all praise- or blameworthy. The right 
question to ask is: Did the feature in question move the degree of _________–




Of course, one could simply accept the asymmetry. One might, for instance, 
attempt to explain it by drawing an analogy to the famous “Knobe effect.” This 
effect (named after Joshua Knobe), occurs when subjects are asked whether the side 
effects of some agent’s actions were intentional.15 Subjects tend to say “yes” when 
the side effects include something harmful, but tend to say “no” when the side 
effects include something helpful. This appears to reveal an asymmetry in factual 
judgments of intentional action. Knobe’s own interpretation is that subjects’ 
judgments depend on their antecedent assessments of the normative status of the 
                                                 
15 See Joshua Knobe, “Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language,” Analysis 63 
(2003): 190-193; and Joshua Knobe, “The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses 
of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 203-231.  
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action’s side-effects, so that “bad” effects render the action intentional in subjects’ 
eyes, whereas “good” effects don’t. Applied to our Toms, then, it may look like a 
kind of reverse Knobe effect is revealed: Moral ignorance via childhood deprivation 
seems to reduce attributions of responsibility when the actions are bad, whereas it 
increases such attributions when the actions are good. This could mean that factual 
judgments of responsible action also are dependent on antecedent assessments of 
the normative status of the action. 
Given wide acceptance of the Symmetry Thesis, however, it seems that such 
a move would be overly hasty if it is possible instead to interpret the thesis in a way 
that is consistent with our data.16 Indeed, such an interpretation exists: We propose, 
in contrast to the view represented by Figure 1, that negative and positive cases are 
symmetrically structured with respect to the direction various mitigating features 
shift the __________–worthiness judgments in relation to their controls. Understood 
in this way, the relevant comparison point would be the two endpoints of a 




So, with respect to the two endpoints (“completely blameworthy” and 
“completely praiseworthy”), the direction of movement from TomA to TomB, and 
from TomC to TomD, is symmetrical. What their sort of moral ignorance does, on 
this understanding of the relation, is move one more in the overall direction of 
complete praiseworthiness and away from complete blameworthiness. 
                                                 
16 While widely presupposed, the Symmetry Thesis is not accepted universally. For leading 
examples of asymmetricians, see Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990); and Dana Nelkin, Making Sense of Freedom & Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). We have also already mentioned Doris and Knobe’s arguments against a 
version of the Symmetry Thesis. Importantly, though, all of these theorists take their burden of 




If we understand the Symmetry Thesis in this way, then it might be 
preserved in light of our results. To do so, though, we must understand what the 
symmetry could consist in, i.e., what the explanation for the symmetrical movement 
would be. One possibility (continuing on the analogy with intentional action) stems 
from the work of Chandra Sripada, who has argued in favor of what he calls the 
“Deep Self Model” (DSM) of moral responsibility to provide a better explanation of 
the Knobe effect for action intentionality.17 What Sripada argues is that 
intentionality attaches to agents’ actions to the extent that their side-effects 
concord with the values and stable fundamental attitudes—the deep selves—subjects 
attribute to them. If there is no concordance, goes the theory, subjects will be less 
likely to attribute intentionality to the agent’s actions. On this interpretation, then, 
subjects view the harmful side effect in the Knobe studies as in concordance with 
the agent’s deep self and attribute intentionality to it thereby, but they view the 
helpful side effect as in conflict with the agent’s deep self, and so tend not to 
attribute intentionality to it thereby. This is how the DSM maintains a unified 
symmetrical explanation of the Knobe effect: Normative judgments of goodness and 
badness don’t do the relevant work here; the different responses instead flow from 
perceptions of different structural underpinnings. 
We might, then, appeal to the DSM to explain our results regarding 
responsibility. In particular, it will be useful for our purposes to explore whether 
the DSM alone can explain the results while also preserving the Symmetry 
Thesis, just as it purports to do with respect to the Knobe effect. One immediate 
problem with this is figuring out just how the concordance condition should be 
specified with respect to responsibility. Here is one plausible possibility: Agents 
will be viewed as more or less responsible for some action or attitude A solely to 
the extent that A is viewed as concording more or less with their deep selves.18 
Of course, our scales were not put in terms of “responsibility”; rather, they were 
put in terms of praise- and blameworthiness. But perhaps we might articulate 
the DSM in terms of those labels as follows: Agents will be viewed as more or 
less _______-worthy for A solely to the extent that A is viewed as concording 
more or less with their deep selves. Call this the DSMBP. On this application of 
the DSM, one will be viewed as more blameworthy in correspondence with the 
perception that A more closely concords with one’s deep self (and A is bad), 
whereas one will be viewed as more praiseworthy in correspondence with the 
                                                 
17 See Chandra Sekhar Sripada, “The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments 
About Intentional Action,” Philosophical Studies (published on-line 2009). DOI: 10.1007/s11098-
009-9423-5. 
18 Indeed, this would be the view Susan Wolf labels the “Deep Self View” of responsibility that 
she draws from Harry Frankfurt, Charles Taylor, and Gary Watson. See Wolf, pp. 373-379. 
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perception that A more closely concords with one’s deep self (and A is good). 
Can this explain the difference between our various Toms? 
At issue is why moral ignorance via childhood deprivation moves one in 
a positive direction a full step up from control cases in the eyes of subjects. The 
DSMBP would have us believe this is because recognition of that sort of moral 
ignorance affects subjects’ attribution of the relevant actions to the agents’ deep 
selves. But this does not seem to fit the results of our study. According to the 
DSMBP, given that TomB is less blameworthy than TomA, it must be that TomB’s 
action concords less with his deep self—similarly for TomD vs. TomC. But 
neither view seems motivated, precisely because in each pairing the Toms appear 
to have identical deep selves. For example, both TomA and TomB fully embrace 
their racism as adults, and both act on it upon seeing the fallen black man. The 
only difference is in their upbringings. So why should we (or any subject) 
therefore think TomB’s action is less reflective of his deep self than TomA’s? 
One response here would be to suggest that perhaps TomB lacks, or at 
least is deficient in having, a deep self, given the limited range of moral 
alternatives to which he was exposed in his upbringing. This might then explain 
why subjects judge him to be less blameworthy: His action is less concordant 
with his deep self than TomA’s action insofar as TomB doesn’t have as 
sufficiently robust a deep self as TomA. Unfortunately, making this move 
undermines the DSMBP explanation of the positive cases, for if a deprived moral 
upbringing renders one’s deep self less robust or more deficient, and so 
mitigates attributions of responsibility, then it ought to render TomD less 
praiseworthy than TomC in the eyes of subjects. But this is the opposite of our 
results. 
Perhaps we can get a more plausible version of the DSMBP if we start on 
the praiseworthy side of the map. How might we explain the differing 
assessments of TomC and TomD on the DSMBP, given that both Toms were 
stipulated as identically embracing their racism and so would seem to have 
identical deep selves? Perhaps the thought is this: TomD’s upbringing somehow 
made him less committed to the moral beliefs with which he was raised, such 
that when he goes against them, he is more likely to be expressing his actual 
deep self than is TomC. In other words, given their differences in upbringings, 
TomC’s action is viewed as more “out of character,” more anomalous, than 
TomD’s. This thought could then be extended to the negative cases as follows: 
TomB is less blameworthy than TomA because his upbringing somehow renders 
his racist action more anomalous than TomA’s. TomB isn’t “really” committed to 
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his racism, subjects might think, at least in the way that TomA is, so TomB is less 
blameworthy thereby. 
This interpretation of the DSMBP preserves the Symmetry Thesis, but how 
plausible is it? It is unclear to us why subjects would consider TomD’s 
commitment to his moral beliefs to be any less serious than TomC’s (or that 
TomB’s is less serious than TomA’s). Indeed, might not their kind of restricted 
ideological upbringing make them more committed to the belief system into 
which they had been indoctrinated? Might not this indoctrination create, if 
anything, a deep self more in line with its exclusively-taught, unquestioned 
principles than an upbringing without it? To the extent these core “moral” 
principles were instilled in a way that bypassed the ignorant Toms’ rational, 
evaluative stance, they are likely to be resistant to such evaluations, much in the 
way religious belief with its source in childhood indoctrination is often difficult 
to expunge.  
To be clear, we do not reject the possibility of reading a deep self view 
into the results here. It could well be that subjects really are viewing TomD’s 
commitments as less attributable to his deep self than TomC’s. Nevertheless, 
given the vignettes as stated, we have no evidence motivating this approach. 
Certainly, we welcome any future attempts to see whether differential deep self 
commitments are doing any work here. Until then, though, we believe we are 
licensed in assuming that the DSMBP either supports an asymmetrical approach 
to blame- and praiseworthiness or its symmetrical approach is unmotivated and 
(at least initially) implausible. Focusing on attributions to the deep self alone 
does not look as if it will help us. 
In our discussion of the MDE Thesis, we proposed that people’s reactions 
to JoJo and TomB might stem from an appreciation of the difficulty those agents 
would have in doing the right thing. Helpfully, we believe that this idea can be 
extended to likewise explain our results regarding the Symmetry Thesis:  
Difficulty Hypothesis: Moral ignorance resulting from childhood 
deprivation functions symmetrically in both negative and positive 
cases (moving assessments up the single scale of blameworthiness to 
praiseworthiness in relation to the control) in virtue of the difficulty 
agents are viewed as having in overcoming their morally deprived 
upbringing to grasp the relevant moral reasons. 
On this hypothesis, as before, TomB is viewed as less blameworthy than 
TomA in light of how difficult it would be for him to go for a moral alternative not 
included in his morally blinkered upbringing. Our further suggestion is that TomD 
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is viewed as more praiseworthy than TomC in light of how difficult it in fact was for 
him to go for a moral alternative not included in his morally blinkered upbringing. 
This way of viewing the matter easily explains the results while avoiding the dual 
implausibility of thinking that subjects think (a) there is a difference in the deep 
selves for either of the pairings, and (b) childhood indoctrination actually renders 
one’s deep self more open or oriented toward moral alternatives than non-
indoctrinated childhoods. If this is right, then the Symmetry Thesis may not be 
undermined by cases of moral ignorance in upbringing after all.  
As noted earlier, however, we need to be clear about just what the Difficulty 
Hypothesis amounts to. In particular, we need to say something more about the 
nature of the difficulty in question. For one thing, one might worry that talk of 
difficulty just collapses into talk of capacity; perhaps Wolf was right to appeal to 
capacities after all. For another, it might be thought we are suggesting that doing 
something that is inherently difficult (like, say, lifting something heavy) is, in itself, 
sufficient for praise. We agree that this would be implausible. ‘ 
First, even if we grant that talk of difficulty is another way of talking about 
capacity, at the very least our results suggest that capacity talk must be scalar. After 
all, both TomB and TomD are still viewed as ________-worthy for what they have 
done to a significant extent. This means that even though such _________-
worthiness is thought to be affected by moral deprivation and ignorance, it is so 
only to some degree, so that if the Toms are viewed as being incapacitated in some 
respect, it would only be an incapacity by degree. This does not sound, however, 
like traditional talk of capacity, which is typically taken as either obtaining or not; 
and it is not clear what the details of this take on capacity would consist in. At the 
very least, to reintroduce talk of capacity would require some difficult explicatory 
work about its re-envisioned nature that we are unable to assess sight unseen. 
Regardless of whether our claims can somehow be adapted to a kind of 
capacity-talk, our interest is not in capacities themselves, but in the difficulty of 
exercising certain capacities, where we measure this against a baseline of what 
comparable agents might be expected to do. Though there is some historical 
precedence for including difficulty in exercising a capacity in the criteria for moral 
responsibility, the focus has typically been on volitional capacities.19 It is difficult for 
the unwilling addict, for example, to resist taking the drug because his counter-
desire, his craving for the drug, is so strong. To the extent we cut him some slack, 
then, we may do so because we think it was just too difficult for him to overcome 
that volitional obstacle, where the same would be expected of other similarly 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., a recent thread kicked off by Dana Nelkin on the agency and responsibility blog 




situated agents. (Of course, this way of putting it might raise capacity talk once 
more, for perhaps the unwilling addict really is incapacitated with respect to 
volitional obstacles of that strength, or perhaps he partially lacks a “meta-capacity” 
to exercise his volitional capacities.20) 
The difficulty we appeal to is analogous to that just mentioned, but differs 
in that it concerns perceptual, rather than volitional capacities.21 Indeed, there is no 
reason to think that our Toms are struggling against their own desires and 
inclinations otherwise to do what’s right. Rather, it is just harder for our Toms to 
“see” what the right thing to do is, given their morally deprived upbringings. When 
they do, it is surprising, for we tend to think that most people from their 
background would not have seen the light. 
As an analogy, suppose that I have been shown the famous image of the 
“duckrabbit” repeatedly since childhood (see Figure 3), and I have been taught over 
and over that what I am looking at is a duck, and only a duck. When, as an adult, I 
meet you, and you insist that the image can also be seen as a rabbit, it will be no 
surprise if, given my upbringing, I have a very hard time coming to see it as a 
rabbit. Certain features of the picture have been drilled into me as exclusively 
salient (e.g., the bill), so it is quite difficult for me to come to see other features (e.g., 
the little “rabbit mouth” indentation on the back of the duck’s head) as salient in my 
assessment of the image. Suppose, however, that someone else present, who was 
raised just as I was to see the duck, is able to see the rabbit quite quickly once told 
about it. Especially if we have taken my inability to see the rabbit as representative 
of the baseline, we are likely to be impressed with this person. We will probably 
applaud his ability to see past what he is used to. 
Of course, again, one might suggest that this is best understood in terms of 
capacities—perhaps he has a stronger “meta-capacity” to exercise his perceptual 
capacities than I do—but this is not necessary. Regardless of where we come down 
on capacity-talk, the point remains that this person’s ability to see the rabbit is 
impressive, and speaks highly of him as a perceiver. Our suggestion is that, on 
analogy, we are more likely to praise TomD because we are impressed with his 
ability to “see” past what he is used to, morally speaking. 
                                                 
20 One might read Harry Frankfurt in the former way. See his “Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person,” in Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11-25. 
21 By “perceptual” capacity, we mean whatever capacity allows apprehension of moral qualities 





Figure 3: Duckrabbit 
 
This way of thinking about difficulty also responds to the worry that 
praiseworthiness might attach to any old difficulty. We are merely advancing the 
Difficulty Hypothesis to explain cases of moral ignorance given childhood 
deprivation, and what it appeals to is specifically perceptual difficulty in grasping 
moral reasons. We take no stand on whether it applies to volitional difficulty, or 
other sorts of difficulty for that matter. 
 
Revisiting Huck 
Our primary aim in this essay has been to bring some empirical results to bear on 
the MDE and Symmetry theses. While the MDE Thesis looks false in light of our 
results, there is a weaker, scalar, version of it that may be defensible. And while it 
may seem as if our results cause real worries for the Symmetry Thesis, it too may be 
defended. What inclines us toward the latter stance in both cases is the unified 
defense that may be provided them by the Difficulty Hypothesis. 
We conclude where we began, with Huckleberry Finn. Huck has been raised 
to believe that stealing someone’s property is immoral, and that slaves are people’s 
property. As he grows he continues to mouth and even embrace the racist 
judgments instilled in him by his family and community since childhood. But when 
he is finally presented with an opportunity to turn Jim in, he balks, going against 
his moral beliefs, and thus opting for hell instead. He is represented by our TomD, 
and people view him not only as praiseworthy, but as more praiseworthy than 
someone just like him but without the childhood moral deprivation. 
There has been a lot of philosophical ink spilled (or at least a lot of words 
processed) on the Huck Finn case in recent years.22 Our aim hasn’t been to resolve 
the many issues raised in these discussions; rather, it has been the far more modest 
                                                 
22 For a tiny sampling, see Jonathan Bennett, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” Philosophy 
49 (1974): 123-134; Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, “Praise, Blame, and the 
Whole Self,” Philosophical Studies 93 (1999): 161-188; Joel J. Kupperman, Character (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991); and Craig Taylor, “Moral Incapacity and Huckleberry Finn,” 
Ratio 14 (2001): 56-67. 
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one of providing some much-needed empirical background to them. Far too often, 
discussion of the case proceeds by stating what our pretheoretic intuitions about 
Huck are. Ours is the only study we know of that attempts to determine just what 
those intuitions consist in. People do view him (or someone very much like him) as 
quite praiseworthy, although not completely so. 
 Further, we have attempted to show just how much of a role the moral 
deprivations of someone-like-Huck’s upbringing contribute to people’s assessments 
of his praiseworthiness. It indeed matters that he’s been raised the way he has, 
moving him up the scale of praiseworthiness a full step over someone who does 
what he does without such a background. But one surprising feature of the study is 
that his increased praiseworthiness seems disanalogous to how people view our 
JoJo lookalike, who is less blameworthy—less responsible??—for his bad deeds than 
a morally undeprived doppelganger. 
Indeed, here is the precise rub for determining whether the results of our 
study negatively impact or ultimately reinforce the Symmetry Thesis: Childhood 
moral deprivations are often thought to mitigate responsibility itself. Being more or 
less blameworthy may simply be viewed as translating to being more or less 
responsible. If responsibility is indeed scalar in this fashion, then our results suggest 
that there is in fact an asymmetry between negative and positive cases: Morally 
deprived upbringings are viewed as decreasing one’s responsibility in the negative 
realm and increasing one’s responsibility in the positive realm. This would truly be 
a surprising result. 
Less surprising, but perhaps no less interesting, would be a different 
interpretation: Responsibility may not be scalar in the way just suggested; instead, 
perhaps it is either not scalar at all (one either is responsible for something or one 
isn’t), or it is scalar, just not in line with the scalar nature of blame- and 
praiseworthiness (perhaps it is scalar in line with various capacities one may have 
or exercise by degrees, where this doesn’t affect degrees of blame- or 
praiseworthiness). If this is the case, then the Symmetry Thesis might be reinforced. 
If we think of blame- and praiseworthiness on a single scale, then (where full-blown 
responsibility would attach to one’s actions at any point on the scale, say), the 
moral deprivations of childhood could be viewed symmetrically in negative and 
positive cases as moving one away (by roughly the same amount) from the 
completely blameworthy endpoint. 
While we haven’t taken a definitive stand either way here, our previous 
discussion on the JoJo case does provide some explanatory ammunition if one 
adopts the second approach. What could well be moving the assessments of _____–
worthiness up the scale away from complete blameworthiness is that people view 
childhood moral deprivations as making moral perception more difficult for their 
agents, so that adhering to, or overcoming, the judgments ingrained by those 
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deprivations will predictably yield assessments at a different degree than their 
nondeprived counterparts. Just as we cut JoJo some slack for doing what it would 
have been difficult for him not to see as wrong, we also admire Huck for having 
done what it was difficult for him to see as right. Or at least we admire Huck in a 
different way, or to a different degree, than we would those who more easily saw 
what he didn’t because of their more privileged upbringing. As his internal 
monologue suggests, it’s a serious and genuine struggle for him to reject “morality” 
in the way he does. That he did so and got it right (despite what he still thought) is 
worthy of real praise, apparently. It is an unexpected surprise. 
There is, as always, much more work to be done on these issues. In 
particular, it would be valuable to know more about the reasons our positive Toms 
went against their moral beliefs. Again, we deliberately left this part open so as not 
to beg the question against any particular theory of relevant moral reasons, but in 
doing so we also left it open that the Toms might have changed their minds by 
accident, or under the influence of various nonrational forces. (We doubt this is 
how the cases were interpreted, but it’s certainly possible.) It would also be 
interesting to know whether it’s the mere isolation of their upbringing or the 
specific moral facts from which they have been deprived that is doing the work on 
people’s different intuitions. To test this, one might have TomC and TomD raised in 
different degrees of isolation but now indoctrinated with the same set of moral 
facts, that people are to be treated equally, etc.; then have them both act in 
accordance with their moral beliefs in helping the fallen man up. Whether or not 
there is a difference in people’s moral intuitions, we would learn something 
interesting. In addition, the degree of praiseworthiness people would assign may be 
compared to the degrees assigned in our present cases, so that we may know more 
about how people assess right-doing in line with moral upbringing. Indeed, finding 
out how people assess these cases will likely tell us even more about how we ought 
to view the Symmetry Thesis, and so could ultimately generate real philosophical 
payoff.23 
                                                 
23 We are very grateful to the folks at Yale’s Experiment Month for carrying out our proposed 
study on these issues. We are also grateful to Don Callen for serving as advisor to the study, and 
to Tamler Sommers and Michael McKenna for discussion of some of the ideas herein. 
